


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
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EGYPT: President Sadat has attempted to underscore for the US and his Arab audience the idea that Egypt's military preparations should be taken seriously.

In contrast to his speech on 26 March, Sadat adopted a negative tone on prospects for negotiations in an interview with Newsweek on Thursday. He stated that he had "run out of ideas" and that there was nothing left but to fight. Egypt would be prepared to negotiate directly with Israel, Sadat declared, but only after the battle had begun.

Sadat bluntly stated that US "calculations" regarding prospects for a Middle East settlement are incorrect and warned that US interests in the area would suffer the consequences of Washington's actions and policies. He also rejected alleged US demands that Cairo openly declare its recognition of Israel's rights and make further concessions to Tel Aviv.

Egypt's rhetoric is traditionally more militant than its actions, and its current talk of "all-out confrontation" is in large part intended to raise apprehensions in the US and other Western capitals in the hope of stimulating greater diplomatic efforts. The militant tone of Sadat's remarks also reflect Cairo's pessimism about the prospects for a diplomatic settlement to the Arab-Israeli deadlock. Egyptian officials are disappointed that no concrete US initiative has emerged, and reports of promises of additional US military hardware for Israel have deepened their unhappiness. In spite of other militant gestures, such as Sadat's assuming the post of military governor general, there are no apparent indications that Egypt has begun to prepare its forces seriously for a military venture against Israel.

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